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TAMING THE FCPA OVERREACH THROUGH AN 
ADEQUATE PROCEDURES DEFENSE 
DIETER JUEDES* 
ABSTRACT 
Currently many American corporations must pursue and develop 
international business relationships. For these American firms, the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is the most important U.S. law 
governing international commerce. The FCPA prohibits firms from brib-
ing foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business in a 
foreign country. Despite its infrequent use during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) enforcement actions under the statute have exploded in 
the last few years. Due to this increase in enforcement and the difficulties 
in complying with the FCPA, the anti-bribery statute has caused American 
firms to avoid foreign markets and prospective growth areas, creating a 
competitive imbalance for U.S. companies. 
This Article proposes an adequate procedures defense as the best way 
to fix this imbalance and allow American corporations to operate efficiently 
overseas without the cloud of FCPA liability hanging over them. The de-
fense would allow American firms to escape FCPA liability upon showing 
that they had adequate procedures in place designed to detect and prevent 
international bribery. To be sure, Congress has recently considered amending 
the FCPA to add a similar defense, and others have suggested that Congress 
take such action. However, this piece goes further in so much as it proposes 
specific statutory language that Congress could use in adopting such a 
defense and it establishes precise factors to be promulgated by the DOJ 
and SEC for determining whether a firm’s procedure would be deemed 
“adequate.” Lastly, the Article details projected outcomes associated with 
American firms being able to use the adequate procedures defense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To survive in today’s complex commercial world, many American 
corporations must develop international business relationships and pursue 
transactional opportunities abroad.1 For these American firms, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)2 is the most important United States (U.S.) 
law governing international commerce.3 Passed in 1977, the FCPA prohib-
its American corporations (both public and private)4 from paying bribes to 
foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business in a for-
eign country.5 To promote the anti-bribery ban further, the FCPA also re-
quires that corporations with securities listed in the U.S. keep financial 
books and records that accurately reflect payment to foreign officials and 
maintain a system of internal accounting controls.6 The books and records 
provision works in tandem with the bribery provision, as one (the bribery 
                                                 
1 Indeed, American firms are looking outside the United States in part because of the 
“increase in globalization and the saturation of domestic markets.” Mike Koehler, The 
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 997 (2010) [hereinafter Koehler, 
Façade]; see also Ashby Jones, Legal Maze’s Murkiest Corners, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 
2012, at B1, B5 (explaining that American “companies are rely[ing] on markets outside 
the U.S. for an increasing percentage of revenue”). 
2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2006). 
3 See Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 997. 
4 The FCPA’s bribery prohibition is also applicable against U.S. citizens, foreign 
companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange, or any person who, while physically present 
in the U.S. pays, offers to pay, or promises to pay a foreign official anything of value to 
obtain or retain business. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1), 78dd-3(a)(1) 
(2006). However, this paper only focuses on the impact of the FCPA on American cor-
porations and their subsidiaries. Notably, the Act is applicable to U.S. parent corporations 
for the actions of their foreign subsidiaries. See The Lay Person’s Guide to the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, at 3, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf [hereinafter DOJ, 
Lay Person’s Guide]. FCPA enforcement actions have predominantly targeted American 
firms. See Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, SHEARMAN & STERLING 
LLP, Feb. 13, 2008, at 2–4, available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA 
_Trends.pdf. 
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). It is notable that with respect to U.S. companies, the 
FCPA has extraterritorial application—a violation can occur even if the prohibited 
conduct takes place entirely outside the U.S. Id. Congress passed the Act in 1977, in the 
wake of Watergate investigations, which revealed corporate bribery practices. STUART H. 
DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
1 (2005). According to the Department of Justice, “Congress enacted the FCPA to bring a 
halt to the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of 
the American business system.” DOJ, Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 4. 
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006). 
40 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:037 
provision) punishes an occurrence of bribery, while the other (the books 
and records provision) helps detect bribery.7 
Generally, the Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces the criminal anti-
bribery provision and willful violations of the books and records provision,8 
while the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces the civil 
anti-bribery provision with respect to issuers.9 The DOJ and SEC seek (and 
often times garner) monetary penalties or settlements for violations of the 
FCPA.10 When sanctioning firms, as opposed to individuals, organizations 
charged with criminal violations of the anti-bribery provisions may face 
fines of up to $2 million per violation.11 
Despite the statute’s infrequent use in its first twenty-five years,12 the 
number of FCPA enforcement actions has greatly increased in the past six 
years.13 The DOJ recently said that enforcing the FCPA is now one of its 
                                                 
7 See ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 2 (2010) [hereinafter WEISSMANN & SMITH], http://www.instituteforlegal 
reform.com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf. 
8 DOJ, Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 4, at 2 (“The Department of Justice is re-
sponsible for all criminal enforcement.”). 
9 See id. Because all criminal violations of the Act are conducted by the DOJ, the SEC 
may send a case to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. See Amy Deen Westbrook, 
Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 495 n.14 (2011). 
10 See Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to 
Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 793–94 (2011). Besides monetary fines, another po-
tent sanction remains available to the DOJ for violations of the FCPA—debarment of the 
firm from future contracts with the U.S. government. This sanction is available under the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). See FAR 9.406-5 (2010). 
11 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), 78ff(c)(1)(A)–(2)(A) (2006). 
The SEC has a wide amount of discretion in determining the nature of its civil enforce-
ment actions; the agency can seek fines, injunctions, or both of these remedies. See David 
C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and 
the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and 
Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009). 
12 See Daniel Chow, China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
573, 574 n.2 (noting that in 2003 the U.S. government initiated nine FCPA investigations). 
13 See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its 
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389 (2010) [hereinafter Koehler, Resurgence] 
(“[D]uring the past decade, enforcement agencies resurrected the FCPA from near legal 
extinction.”); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 494 (noting the “recent radicalization” of the 
FCPA’s enforcement); see also Joseph Palazzolo, U.S. Probes Motorola Solutions, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, at B8 (“In recent years, the SEC and Justice Department have 
enforced the FCPA aggressively and have added staff in their anti-bribery units.”). In 
November 2010, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated that “FCPA enforce-
ment is stronger than it’s ever been—and getting stronger.” See Lanny Breuer, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign 
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top priorities—second only to fighting terrorism.14 Indeed, in 2010, seventy-
four enforcement actions were brought by the DOJ and SEC, and eight of 
the ten costliest FCPA-related settlements were reached.15 There are a mul-
titude of reasons for the increase in enforcement actions, including the in-
crease in global business transactions,16 the recent global financial crisis17 and 
related U.S. corporate scandals,18 and aggressive prosecution and regulation.19 
                                                                                                                         
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov 
/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html). 
14 See Laurence A. Urgenson et al., New Bumps and Tolls Along the Road to FCPA 
Settlements, BUS. CRIMES BULLETIN, Nov. 1, 2009, at 1. 
15 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. In 
2011, the DOJ initiated twenty-three enforcement actions and the SEC initiated twenty-
five, for a total of forty-eight. United States: 2011 FCPA Enforcement Actions Reach 
Second-Highest Level, DE BRAUW BLACKSTONE WESTBROEK (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www 
.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/162240/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/2011+FCPA+Enforcement 
+Actions+Reach+SecondHighest+Level. In 2012, the DOJ initiated eleven enforcement ac-
tions and the SEC initiated twelve enforcement actions, for a total of twenty-three. 2012 
Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 2, 2013), http:// 
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2012YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. Despite 
enforcement actions decreasing in two consecutive years, all indications are that FCPA 
enforcement will continue to be robust. Id. (quoting Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney 
General for the DOJ’s Criminal Division, as stating that “there is no turning back” from 
the “robust FCPA enforcement” of previous years.). Indeed, a recent survey completed 
by the Wall Street Journal reflected that the FCPA remains one of the top concerns for 
companies and their in-house legal counsel. Jones, supra note 1, at B1. 
16 See MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN & DANIEL R. BIEGELMAN, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT COMPLIANCE GUIDEBOOK: PROTECTING YOUR ORGANIZATION FROM BRIBERY AND 
CORRUPTION xxi (2010) (noting the current importance of the FCPA due to the glob-
alization of business); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 518 (explaining the “growth in global 
business opportunities during the economic boom of the mid-2000s”); see also Lawrence 
J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield 
for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 146 (2011) (noting the “[i]ncreased interna-
tional commerce between the United States and faster growing economies such as the 
People’s Republic of China”). 
17 See Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2010, at A1. 
18 See Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 781, 794 (2011) [hereinafter Yockey, Solicitation]. 
19 See id. at 793 (noting that prosecutors may be “turning up the heat” so that they can 
transition to lucrative private sector employment where they then represent companies 
facing FCPA scrutiny); see also Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery 
Hurts Business and Enriches Insiders, FORBES (May 24, 2010), http://www.forbes.com 
/forbes/2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html. As an ex-
ample, Vardi notes William Jacobson, who transitioned from a justice official to partner 
at a large law firm and eventually general counsel at a corporation that previously had 
bribery problems. Id. 
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Because of the increase in FCPA enforcement20 and the strong reme-
dial powers available to the DOJ and SEC,21 the FCPA is currently one of 
the most feared statutes for American firms operating overseas.22 This fear 
stems from the fact that perfect compliance with the FCPA is oftentimes 
extremely difficult due to the statute’s expansive language, its lack of af-
firmative defenses, the absence of judicial and administrative guidance, 
and the practical realities involved in generating international business.23 
With the increased enforcement of the FCPA and the difficulties in 
complying with the statute, American firms are at a disadvantage when it 
comes to competing internationally.24 Indeed, both large and small firms 
have spent millions of dollars on FCPA compliance, have poured money 
and energy into internal investigations aimed at determining whether a 
FCPA violation occurred, and have, in certain instances, avoided foreign 
markets altogether because of the FCPA.25 These implications reveal just 
how helpless American firms are against the FCPA. American firms need 
some type of tool that will incentivize compliance with the Act and curtail 
liability when the DOJ or SEC brings an action, and this tool is an “ade-
quate procedures” defense. This defense will allow any American firm 
charged with violating the FCPA to show that it had adequate procedures 
in place to prevent a violation, and if the procedures are deemed sufficient, 
the firm avoids liability.26 
                                                 
20 See Koehler, Resurgence, supra note 13, at 389; see also Mike Koehler, Revisiting 
a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 657 
(2012) [hereinafter Koehler, Revisiting] (noting that approximately eighty companies are 
currently under investigation for FCPA violations). 
21 2008 and 2009 saw record-setting settlements—for example, Siemens AG ($800 
million) and Halliburton ($579 million). This trend continued in 2010: Technip ($338 
million) and Snamprogetti/ENI ($365 million). Westbrook, supra note 9, at 492–93. 
22 See Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 781. 
23 See infra Part I. 
24 See infra Part II. 
25 See infra Part II. 
26 See infra Part III for a detailed discussion, including the predicted outcomes, of the 
adequate procedures defense. Additionally, it should be noted that similar proposed de-
fenses have been dubbed the FCPA “due diligence defense” and the compliance defense. 
See Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 609, 618; James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: 
A Modest Proposal for Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 
BUS. LAW. 1233, 1234 (2007). This Article uses the phrase “adequate procedures defense” 
because it best embodies the fact that (1) procedures must be in place designed to prevent 
bribery and (2) those procedures have to be “adequate.” This proposal differs from the 
others insomuch as it (1) establishes specific factors to be promulgated by the DOJ and 
SEC for determining whether or not a procedure will be “adequate,” and (2) details spe-
cific projected outcomes associated with American firms being able to use the defense. 
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To be sure, this Article does not posit that the FCPA should be out-
lawed or that foreign bribery is appropriate.27 Bribery impacts the allocation 
of scarce public resources,28 distorts markets, and reduces investment.29 
This Article argues that to strike the proper balance between the necessity 
to prevent bribery and allow American corporations to operate efficiently 
overseas without the threat of FCPA liability, Congress should amend the 
FCPA to add an affirmative adequate procedures defense. Further, the DOJ 
and SEC should promulgate a rule detailing factors that will be reviewed 
in determining whether a corporation had adequate procedures in place. In 
leading up to these proposals, Part I of this Article details the current diffi-
culties American firms face in complying with the FCPA and avoiding 
liability exposure. Part II then analyzes the implications arising out of the 
difficulties in compliance. Part III details and projects the outcomes of the 
adequate procedures defense. The Conclusion offers a brief summation. 
I. COMPLIANCE DIFFICULTIES 
Complying with the FCPA and limiting exposure to DOJ or SEC en-
forcement actions is a difficult, if not overwhelming, task for many American 
corporations.30 These difficulties stem from numerous considerations in-
cluding expansive FCPA statutory language and interpretation, a lack of 
(and narrowly interpreted) affirmative defenses to liability, missing judi-
cial or administrative clarification, and the practical realities associated 
with pursuing international business transactions. Each consideration re-
ceives explanation below, in turn. 
A. Expansive Statutory Language and Interpretation 
The FCPA’s bribery provision generally prohibits American compa-
nies (or their agents) from corruptly paying or offering to pay money or 
                                                 
27 Cf. Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (explaining that U.S. companies have no desire to 
compete on the basis of bribery). 
28 See Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983). 
29 Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid 
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 441 (2010) (“Bribery 
inhibits economic growth by two primary mechanisms: economic inefficiency and 
reduced investment.”). 
30 See Editorial, Justice’s Bribery Racket, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2012, at A12 (“Over 
the last five years, however, Justice has begun to stretch the law into a far more blunt 
instrument. Instead of going after clear violations, the vague statute has become a tool to 
prosecute or threaten legions of companies.”). 
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anything of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain business.31 Both 
the DOJ and SEC have taken an expansive interpretation of the statute, 
specifically with respect to what constitutes a foreign official.32 The statute 
defines “foreign official” in part as “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof ....”33 
The most confusing part of this definition is the term “instrumentality,” 
which itself is not defined in the statute.34 The DOJ and SEC have not 
clarified or established a list of factors for determining whether someone 
is an instrumentality of a foreign government.35 In direct contrast, the DOJ 
has admitted that “it is entirely possible, under certain circumstances and 
in certain countries, that nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture, 
import, export, pricing, sale and marketing of a drug product in a foreign 
country will involve a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”36 
As evidenced by the DOJ’s statement above, in many instances the 
term “instrumentality” “sweeps in payments to companies that are state-
owned or state-controlled.”37 Once that company is “defined as an instru-
mentality” under the FCPA, all employees or agents of the company “are 
considered ‘foreign officials.’”38 The courts have not tested this expansive 
definition of foreign official,39 and recently members of Congress have 
encouraged the DOJ to clarify “under what circumstances an employee of 
an instrumentality who is not exercising the sovereign authority of the 
state may be considered a ‘foreign official.’”40 
                                                 
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006). 
32 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 
(2011) [hereinafter FCPA Hearing] (statement of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey, Partner, 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The DOJ’s and SEC’s enforcement ... make clear that they 
interpret the terms ‘foreign official’ and ‘instrumentality’ extremely broadly.”); Westbrook, 
supra note 9, at 531 (noting that the “most contentious point of [the] FCPA interpreta-
tion” is what constitutes a “foreign official”). 
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A) (2006). 
34 Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 
Winter 2008 at 14, 16 (“The meaning of the term ‘instrumentality’ is one of the most 
challenging aspects of FCPA compliance.”). 
35 See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 532. 
36DOJ’s FCPA Team Pressing Forward With Pharma Probes, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP 
(July 20, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/item.asp?item=4976. 
37 WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 25. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. 
40 Letter from Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator (Democrat, Minnesota), & Chris Coons, 
U.S. Senator (Democrat, Delaware), to Eric Holder, Attorney General (Feb. 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/wp-admin/documents-databases 
/265-2-judiciary_FCPA_02_16_12[1].pdf. This letter demonstrates that the current overreach 
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A few examples demonstrate just how expansively the DOJ and SEC 
interpret the term “instrumentality” within the definition of “foreign official.” 
In an action against American construction company KBR, the DOJ and SEC 
alleged that KBR made improper payments to employees of Nigeria LNG 
Limited (LNG Limited).41 The government claimed that these employees 
were foreign officials under the FCPA despite the fact that the Nigerian 
government had a minority ownership stake in LNG Limited.42 LNG Lim-
ited settled with the government, and thus, the government never clarified 
its interpretation of “foreign official.”43 Additionally, in 2007, the DOJ and 
SEC brought FCPA “actions against Baker Hughes and its subsidiaries for ... 
payments made to a company called Kazakhoil.”44 The agencies claimed 
that these payments violated the FCPA because Kazakhoil was “controlled 
by officials of the Government of Kazakhstan.”45 Baker Hughes settled 
with the agencies for $44.1 million.46 
The difficultly with the loose interpretations of instrumentality is that 
the FCPA now applies to payments made to “non-core” individuals who 
are employed by state-owned entities, including a minority ownership in-
terest by the state (e.g., KBR case), or state-controlled (e.g., Baker Hughes 
case) entities.47 Thus, it is difficult for firms and their agents “to determine 
ex ante what companies are sufficiently state-owned or state-controlled to 
qualify as an instrumentality of a foreign official,” that is, whether the 
FCPA applies to a particular foreign transaction or business relationship.48 
This difficulty is especially prevalent in countries like China, where state 
ownership of companies is particularly high.49 
                                                                                                                         
of the FCPA is an issue for both Democratic and Republican legislators, and presumably 
amending the FCPA would be favored by members from both political parties. See 
Justice’s Bribery Racket, supra note 30 (noting the concern in Congress amongst liberals 
and conservatives). 
41 WEISMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 26. 
42 Id. Indeed, in that case, 51 percent of Nigeria LNG Limited was “owned by a con-
sortium of private multinational oil companies.” Id. 
43See SEC Charges KBR, Inc. with Foreign Bribery, Litigation Release No. 20897A, 95 
SEC Docket 570 (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm. 
44 WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 25. 
45 Id. 
46 See SEC Charges Baker Hughes With Foreign Bribery and With Violating 2001 
Commission Cease-and-Desist Order, Litigation Release No. 20094, 90 SEC Docket 1369 
(Apr. 26, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation /litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm. 
47 See Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 965. 
48 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 821. 
49 WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that “in countries where many 
companies are state-owned,” like China, it is not “immediately apparent whether an in-
dividual” would be a foreign official under the FCPA). In a related vein, pharmaceutical 
companies operating internationally are particularly exposed to the FCPA because “the 
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B. Narrow Exceptions and Affirmative Defenses 
Although the FCPA bribery liability provision has received broad inter-
pretation, the exceptions and defenses to liability are narrow.50 The FCPA 
contains one exception and two affirmative defenses, all three of which 
provide limited safe harbors for firms looking to avoid FCPA scrutiny.51 
1. The Facilitation Payment Exception 
The statute provides an exception for payments made to secure “routine 
governmental action[s].”52 The phrase is defined in the statute as “an ac-
tion which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official,”53 
and it includes several examples, such as payments made in connection 
with granting permits, scheduling inspections, and providing police pro-
tection.54 However, any decision by a foreign official to award new or 
continued business does not fall within the exception.55 Accordingly, the 
payments that cause a foreign official to act with little or no discretion fall 
in the exception and payments that motivate a foreign official to use his or 
her discretion in awarding business do not.56 As Professor Joseph Yockey 
notes, however, the distinction between non-discretionary acts and discre-
tionary acts “is easily stated, but applying it in practice can be difficult.”57 
This real world difficulty in applying the exception makes it almost 
impossible to rely upon.58 For example, in 2008, the DOJ and SEC charged 
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation with FCPA violations 
                                                                                                                         
doctors and hospitals they do business with are government employees in many countries.” 
Johnathan D. Rockoff & Christopher M. Matthews, Pfizer Settles Federal Bribery Investigation, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2012, at B7. At least eight drug makers have acknowledged FCPA in-
vestigations in recent SEC filings. Id. Also, “[t]he [SEC] has written to several Hollywood 
studios” regarding “their dealings with ... officials in China.” John Jannarone & Michelle 
Kung, SEC Probes U.S. Studios on China, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2012, at B2. The in-
quiries are believed to be related to the FCPA, and in the coming months more details 
will surely emerge. See id. For background regarding the FCPA’s application in China, 
see generally Chow, supra note 12. 
50 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 541. 
51 Id. at 505–07. 
52 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2006). 
53 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A) (2006). 
54 Id. 
55 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 818. 
56 See id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 819 (noting that in many circumstances, the exception can “rarely be relied 
upon”); Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542 (“[T]he ambiguity surrounding this exception 
combined with its increased enforcement makes compliance difficult.”). 
2013] TAMING THE FCPA 47 
when its India subsidiary made payments to officials employed by the Indian 
Railway Board.59 Some payments were made for “scheduling pre-shipping 
produce inspections and having certificates of product delivery issued.”60 
“Because the matter ultimately settled through a non-prosecution agreement,” 
it remains unclear why these “payments did not fall within the facilitation 
payment exception.”61 Nevertheless, this example shows the difficulties 
many firms face in determining whether payments made to officials fall 
outside of the exception.62 
2. Affirmative Defenses: Rarely Applicable, Rarely Used 
The first defense applies if the payment, offer, or promise to pay any-
thing of value to a foreign official is “lawful under the written laws and 
regulations” of the foreign country.63 To comply with this defense, the law 
“‘must be affirmatively stated and written; neither negative implication, 
custom, nor tacit approval’” is sufficient.64 Simply put, because no country 
has written laws that expressly permit bribery, this defense is an illusory 
safe harbor.65 
The second defense applies if the payment, offer, or promise to pay any-
thing of value is a “reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and 
lodging expenses... directly related to—(A) the promotion, demonstration, 
or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or performance 
                                                 
59 See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542; Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 818. 
60 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542. 
61 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 819. 
62 Id. 
63 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1) (2006). For background and 
a thorough analysis of the FCPA defenses, see generally Kyle P. Sheahen, Note, I’m Not 
Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464 (2010). 
64 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 506 (quoting David Krakoff et al., FCPA: Handling 
Increased Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement, IN FOCUS: CORPORATE LITIGATION WHITE 
PAPER (Mayer Brown), Feb. 25, 2008, at 3, http://www.mayerbrown.com/Publications/article 
.asp?id=6386). 
65 ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK 16 (2010); 
see also Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 16, at 157 (explaining that experts 
have never found a law that expressly permits bribery). Although the focus of this Article 
is on FCPA firm liability and not individual liability, it bears noting that the FCPA “local 
law defense” was recently invoked by Frederic Bourke. See United States v. Kozeny, 582 
F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Bourke argued that the payments were legal under 
the laws of Azerbaijan because he self-reported the payments, and thus, under Azeri law, 
no prosecution would occur in that county. Id. The U.S. court rejected this argument, 
stating that just because prosecution would not occur in Azerbaijan, it does not neces-
sarily mean that the bribes were legal under that country’s law. Id. at 540. 
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of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof.”66 In essence, 
this defense allows American firms to offer “small gifts as tokens of good-
will or to show hospitality to foreign officials.”67 This defense has been 
deemed “amorphous” because the courts and the DOJ have offered little 
guidance as to when the expenditure is related to goodwill or hospitality, 
or when the expenditure rises to the level of a bribe.68 To date, no court 
has analyzed this defense.69 
C. Lack of Judicial and Administrative Guidance 
When faced with DOJ or SEC FCPA enforcement proceedings, Amer-
ican firms understand “[t]he potential monetary and reputational conse-
quences that would follow from an ... indictment or guilty verdict.”70 Because 
of these consequences, the only realistic option available to businesses is 
to settle their lawsuits.71 In fact, only one business entity has challenged a 
DOJ and SEC enforcement case through trial in the last twenty years.72 
Instead, corporations often enter into settlements in the form of De-
ferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) or Non-Prosecution Agreements 
(NPAs).73 Under DPAs, the DOJ formally charges the corporation, but the 
agency defers actual prosecution so long as certain governance changes 
                                                 
66 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2) (2006). 
67 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 542. 
68 Cf. id. 
69 Id. 
70 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 825; see also Justice’s Bribery Racket, 
supra note 30, at A12 (noting the “reputational risk of an indictment”). 
71 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 825 (noting that “firms feel they must accept” 
settlements); see Joan McPhee, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Ray of Hope or Guilty 
Plea by Another Name?, INSIDE LITIG., Winter 2006, at 4, available at http://www.ropesgray 
.com/files/Publication/a6d348fd-f6fd-4f4a-b38b-bd6de98836b7/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/4d1fdc14-3bcf-463a-b2b0-76204fc7f316/Article_Winter_2006_Deferred 
_Prosecution_Agreements_McPhee.pdf (“Given the breadth of the corporate criminal 
liability doctrine and the potentially devastating consequences of a criminal conviction or 
even indictment, it is the rare corporation today that has a meaningful right to a jury trial 
in the resolution of its corporate criminal disputes with the government.”); see also Doty, 
supra note 26, at 1236 n.9 (explaining that the government uses the “threat of indictment” 
to force firms to settle and not litigate). Doty also notes the “associated practice” of 
requiring firms to waive the attorney-client privilege. Id. 
72 Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 627 n.73 (noting that the only time a corpo-
rate FCPA charge was presented to a jury was in the 2011 Lindsey Manufacturing case); 
see also Koehler, Resurgence, supra note 13, at 406. 
73 Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 933 (“The DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs has ex-
ploded in recent years.”). 
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are implemented and a fine is paid.74 Under NPAs, no formal charges are 
filed, but similar terms and fines are accepted.75 “Because an NPA is not 
filed with a court, there is absolutely no judicial scrutiny” of the facts and 
legal conclusions leading to the settlement.76 Additionally, although a DPA 
is filed with a court and could be subject to judicial scrutiny, the agree-
ments are regularly “rubber-stamped” by judges without modification.77 
This lack of judicial oversight78 yields two important, related outcomes. 
First, the DOJ and SEC’s vast interpretative policies are never limited 
through the judicial process.79 This means that the DOJ and SEC’s interpre-
tations control.80 Second, no precedent is set, and thus, firms have no baseline 
measure for determining which actions are clearly legal under the statute.81 
Instead, firms have little guidance on how to comply with the FCPA.82 
This lack of guidance makes it difficult for American firms to enter emerg-
ing foreign markets and partake in aggressive business transactions with-
out knowing affirmatively whether their actions violate the FCPA.83 
                                                 
74 Doty, supra note 26, at 1236 n.9 (noting that DPAs “have become virtually com-
monplace” in FCPA actions). 
75 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 825. 
76 Koehler, Façade, supra note 1, at 935. 
77 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 893 (2007). 
Several commentators and practitioners who have experience with DPAs and NPAs agree 
that the forms of settlements never face judicial scrutiny. See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. 
Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract 
Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Deferred and non-prosecution agreements often 
occur without judicial oversight or participation .... Even in the rare case that has court 
participation, it is usually a mere formality of the document being filed in the court.”). 
78 James C. Morgan, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Recent Justice Department 
Guidance, Manufactures Alliance/MAPI e-Alert E-466 (Apr. 2, 2008), available at 
http://www.mapi.net/Issues%20in%20Brief/e-Alert466.pdf. 
79 FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Member, 
House Comm. on the Judiciary). 
80 Id. (noting “the absence of case law interpreting the breadth and scope of the FCPA,” 
which consequently “inflates ... prosecutorial discretion”); see also Mike Koehler, Big, 
Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 99, 131–32 (2011) [hereinafter Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre] (explaining that 
lack of “appropriate checks and balances or judicial scrutiny” with respect to FCPA 
enforcement leads to inconsistencies). 
81 FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (explaining 
that industries do not know how to conform to the law); Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre, 
supra note 80, at 131–32 (noting the “lack of consistency and transparency” associated 
with FCPA compliance). 
82 FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that 
“companies lack guidance”). 
83 See id. 
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Not only does the FCPA suffer from a lack of judicial oversight, but 
also the DOJ and SEC have not sufficiently filled this void through admin-
istrative guidance.84 To be sure, “[p]rocedures [do] exist through which the 
DOJ and SEC can provide ... FCPA interpretation.”85 The SEC procedure—
an Opinion Release—is largely unused, as the last time the SEC used this ve-
hicle to clarify the FCPA was 1981, when it explained that action would not 
be taken for minor or unintentional errors in books and recordkeeping.86 
The DOJ vehicle—a DOJ FCPA Opinion Release Procedure—which 
is required by the FCPA statute,87 allows an issuer to “obtain an opinion 
of the Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospective—not 
hypothetical—conduct conforms with the [agency’s] present enforcement 
policy regarding the antibribery provisions” of the Act.88 To obtain an opin-
ion, a company must make a formal inquiry describing the proposed conduct.89 
Within thirty days, the DOJ must respond and state whether it would take 
action on the proposed conduct.90 If the DOJ signs off on the proposed con-
duct and the firm does not deviate from the action that was approved, then 
any DOJ legal proceeding arising out of the approved conduct is subject to 
a rebuttable presumption that the conduct complies with the FCPA.91 
Although on paper the DOJ opinion process appears to be a viable op-
tion for a firm contemplating business in a foreign country, the process has 
                                                 
84 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 496–97. Recently, in November 2012, the DOJ and 
SEC published a guide to help corporations better understand which practices might 
violate the FCPA. A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. FCPA practitioners and scholars 
criticized the guide as doing “little to fill in the gray areas” and being “more of a scrap-
book of past DOJ and SEC successes than a guide book for companies who care about 
playing with the rules.” Joe Palazzolo & Christopher Matthews, Bribery Law Dos and 
Don’ts, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 15, 2012, at B1, B2 (quoting Steven Tyrell, partner at Weil, 
Gotshal & Manges LLP and former chief of the DOJ’s criminal-fraud section); see also 
Mike Koehler, Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, White Collar 
Crime Rep. (BNA) 1, 7 (Dec. 14, 2012) (stating that even after the resource guide, “much 
about FCPA enforcement remains opaque”); Jones, supra note 1, at B5 (explaining that 
the guidance “wasn’t as specific as many companies had hoped”). 
85 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 563. 
86 Statement of Policy, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Exchange Act Release 
No. 17,500, 21 SEC Docket 1466, 1469 (Jan. 29, 1981). 
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 78dd-2(f) (2006). 
88 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.1 (2009). 
89 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.6, 80.7. 
90 28 C.F.R. § 80.8. 
91 See 28 C.F.R. § 80.10. 
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been disused.92 A number of reasons have been suggested for the under-
utilization of this process. First, the process may be seen as mere “window 
dressing” by firms and actually alert law enforcement to potential illegal 
bribery.93 Additionally, the DOJ may be projecting its own discomfort 
with the concept of advising on potentially criminal behavior—a concept 
unique to the FCPA.94 
It should also be noted that the opinion notices are limited to the spe-
cific facts presented and not legally binding on any other company (even if 
the other company’s conduct was directly analogous to conduct opined 
upon in a prior release).95 This consideration, in conjunction with the DOJ 
opinion procedure’s underutilization, illustrates that firms cannot depend 
on the Department for guidance in determining what conduct leads to 
FCPA exposure. 
To recap, the lack of judicial and administrative guidance on the FCPA 
in combination with agencies interpreting the statute broadly while inter-
preting the defenses narrowly creates an environment where businesses 
struggle to comply with the Act. These struggles are only exacerbated by 
the practical realities associated with pursuing foreign business—an area 
detailed next. 
D. Practical Realities in Generating Foreign Business 
As explained in the introduction of this Article, to survive in today’s cor-
porate world, American corporations (both big and small) must search for and 
develop business connections and operations outside of the U.S.96 Foreign 
markets provide access to resources that are not available domestically.97 
In order to facilitate foreign business, many firms have no choice but to use 
agents.98 Additionally many firms must deal with hostile environments in 
                                                 
92 See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov 
/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (documenting two releases in 
2012, one in 2011, three in 2010, and one in 2009); see also Doty, supra note 26, at 1238. 
93 Doty, supra note 26, at 1238 (“[W]hile heightened awareness has led to procedural 
due diligence by U.S. businesses abroad, too often that diligence is dismissed by law 
enforcement as pretense, mere ‘window dressing’ to conceal ‘behind the scenes’ cir-
cumvention of the law that businesses and host governments alike are deemed to under-
stand and countenance.”). 
94 Doty, supra note 26, at 1238 & n.17. 
95 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.11, 80.13 
(2012) (narrowing the scope and limiting the effect of an opinion release). 
96 Doty, supra note 26, at 1252. 
97 See supra note 1. 
98 See Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 784. 
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which bribery is not suggested by the firm’s agent, but instead is demanded 
by the foreign official.99 
1. Necessity to Use Agents 
In foreign markets, “business traditions and customs are far different 
[from] those in the United States.”100 These differences cause transnational 
firms to use “specialized local agents and intermediaries.”101 Using agents 
also allows firms to enter new markets without having to set up an actual 
office or subsidiary in that foreign state.102 However, as detailed further in 
Subsection II below, employees or agents in these countries are often subject 
to widespread corruption and they often discover that bribery is necessary 
to gain access into a market and to continue business in that market.103 
Under the FCPA, bribery committed by an agent or employee is par-
ticularly significant because it can lead to a firm being held liable under 
principles of vicarious liability.104 This common law doctrine allows a cor-
poration to be held liable for the acts of its employees where the act was 
within the scope of employment and benefited, at least partially, the orga-
nization.105 Almost all FCPA corporate enforcement actions are based on 
principles of vicarious liability because firms can only act through their 
agents or employees.106 
Corporations can implement strategies to deter agent bribery and thus 
reduce exposure under vicarious liability.107 The strategies may include 
offering monetary incentives to the agent to deter bribery, having policies 
and procedures in place to prevent and detect bribery, and conducting due 
diligence before deciding to place an agent in a certain country.108 However, 
                                                 
99 Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of Compliance,” 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 710 [hereinafter Yockey, FCPA Settlement] (noting that many 
foreign markets are rife with corruption). 
100 Westbrook, supra note 9, at 518 (quoting Phyllis Diamond, Attorney Sees More 
Individuals Named in Ramped Up FCPA Enforcement Effort, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), 
no. 32, 2009 at 1495). 
101 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 808. 
102 ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION 1213 (2007). 
103 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 810. 
104 Id. at 809; Frank C. Razzano & Travis P. Nelson, The Expanding Criminalization 
of Transnational Bribery: Global Prosecution Necessitates Global Compliance, 42 INT’L 
LAW. 1259, 1275–76 (2008). 
105 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, 9-28.800 (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.800 
(elaborating the principals of federal prosecution of business organizations). 
106 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 810. 
107 Id. at 811. 
108 Id. 
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there is currently no statutory-based acknowledgement (i.e., statutory-
based defense) for having adequate procedures in place designed to pre-
vent bribery.109 Consequentially, as Professor Yockey explains, “firms have 
been prosecuted where the employees responsible for the alleged viola-
tions acted contrary to well-documented FCPA compliance policies.”110 
2. Bribe Demands 
When tapping into foreign resources and entering foreign markets, 
“American businesses ... operate in some of the most corrupt and ‘failed’ 
states on the globe.”111 As a result, these businesses receive demands for 
bribes quite frequently.112 These demands can take a variety of forms, in-
cluding being asked to sponsor activities in exchange for a government 
contract and paying various fees for routine government-related transac-
tions.113 Additionally, outright extortion of American companies operating 
overseas is not uncommon.114 Extortion takes the form of requests for 
payment (or goods) under a threat to terminate the corporation’s current 
investment.115 
Although it is often difficult to track the amount of demand-side brib-
ery and extortion, a recent survey of more than 2,700 business executives 
in twenty-six countries found that about 40 percent of respondents had 
                                                 
109 Doty, supra note 26, at 1235–36 (explaining that “the current law enforcement 
regime ... impute[s] vicarious liability to the corporate enterprise without regard” to the 
firm’s “codes of conduct [that] prohibit FCPA violations”). 
110 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 811. 
111 Doty notes that the reason companies operate in these areas is perhaps best 
captured by Willie Sutton’s statement that “he robbed banks ‘because that’s where the 
money is.’” Doty, supra note 26, at 1252 (citing Famous Cases & Criminals: Willie 
Sutton, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/willie-sutton (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2013)). 
112 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., RESIST: RESISTING EXTORTION AND 
SOLICITATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 6 (2011), available at http://www.iccw 
bo.org/Data/Documents/Corporate-Responsibility-and-Anti-corruption/RESIST-English/; 
Former DOJ FCPA Chief Supports FCPA Compliance Defense, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 4, 
2011) (quoting Joseph Covington, former DOJ FCPA Unit Chief), http://www.fcpaprofessor 
.com/former-doj-fcpa-chief-supports-fcpa-compliance-defense (“[i]n my almost 40 years of 
experience, I have rarely seen American companies affirmatively offering bribes in the first 
instance; rather they are typically reacting to a world not of their making.”); see also Koehler, 
Revisiting, supra note 20, at 620 (explaining that American firms operating in foreign 
countries “are often funneled into an arbitrary world of low-paying civil servants who fre-
quently supplement their meager salaries through payments condoned in the host country”). 
113 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 795. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 795–96. 
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been sought out to pay a bribe.116 In certain countries, including Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan, this number rose to al-
most 60 percent.117 To be sure, this survey only reflects one side of the 
story. Often times it is hard to determine whether a foreign official first 
demanded bribery or whether the foreign official’s demand followed pre-
vious bribery suggestions or actual bribery on the part of the firm.118 Nev-
ertheless, regardless of what came first, a bribe demand or a bribe solicita-
tion, bribery in some way, shape, or form is seen as a normal course of 
business in order to transact internationally.119 
To be clear, the prevalence of demand-side bribery noted in this sec-
tion is not meant to suggest that bribery should be tolerated or that the 
FCPA should not apply in foreign countries.120 It is noted to show that in 
some countries the prevalence and frequency of bribery may cause a rogue 
employee or agent to go against a firm’s anti-bribery policy and bribe a 
foreign official.121 These firms are then subjected to potential liability de-
spite their good-faith efforts to curtail bribery.122 Of course, these firms 
could have simply opted not to transact in a specific country, especially 
when aware that their agents may subject them to FCPA liability.123 How-
ever, given the vast resources available in foreign markets and the necessi-
ty to tap into these resources,124 it is unrealistic and imprudent to force 
                                                 
116 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009 4 (2009), available at 
http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2009/2009_09_23
_gcr_2009. 
117 Id. at 4. 
118 See Yockey, FCPA Settlement, supra note 99, at 711 (noting there are “situations 
where the lines between bribery and extortion are blurry”); see also James Lindgren, The 
Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 
1695–98 (1993) (explaining that it is difficult to distinguish bribery from extortion). 
119 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 795 (“[F]irms doing business abroad 
continue to report receiving demands for bribes—including some demands that rise to the 
level of extortion—on a daily basis.”). 
120 See Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (“U.S. businessmen want the statutory policies of 
the FCPA to prevail. Repeal of the statute would enable states tolerant of corrupt be-
havior by their national industries to up the ante without restraint.”). But see Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Bribes vs. Bombs: A Study in Coasean Warfare, 29 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 179, 179–81 (2009) (noting that bribery may help resolve 
disputes); Donald Bates, Payola’s Payoff: Legalize Bribery? Yes, It’s a Fact of Life, 
HOUS. CHRON. Jan. 15, 2006, http://www.chron.com/default/article/Legalize-bribery-Yes 
-it-s-a-fact-of-life-1476410.php. 
121 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
123 Yockey, Solicitation, supra note 18, at 809–10. 
124 Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 16, at 147 (explaining that “[f]oreign 
operations constitute a major source of revenues and earnings” for American companies). 
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American firms to choose between either staying out of these markets or 
being subjected to FCPA scrutiny. As former SEC General Counsel James 
Doty notes, “[t]o serve the national interest, American businesses must 
operate” internationally.125 Because American firms must operate interna-
tionally, their only choice then is to face the current overreach of the FCPA. 
Part I of this Article documented the current difficulties American 
firms have in complying with the FCPA. These difficulties stem from a 
number of interrelated considerations. The DOJ and SEC interpret the 
statutory text to cover a wide variety of circumstances that subject firms to 
liability in which they have limited legitimate defenses.126 More specifi-
cally, the realities of operating internationally are not considered in estab-
lishing liability or as an affirmative defense.127 Because firms know that 
FCPA liability is easily established, they are unwilling to try FCPA en-
forcement actions. Thus, no limiting principles are established through the 
judiciary, and this is compounded by the unwillingness of the DOJ and 
SEC to limit their interpretations or provide meaningful guidance.128 
There are numerous implications that result from the difficulties 
American firms have in complying with the FCPA, an area detailed next. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FCPA IN LIGHT OF THE 
DIFFICULTY WITH COMPLIANCE 
The recent enforcement expansion of the FCPA and the difficulties 
firms have in complying with the Act yield two principal outcomes. First, 
firms must deal with the monetary and reputational consequences of fac-
ing DOJ and SEC FCPA actions.129 Second, these monetary and reputa-
tional considerations influence future foreign business decisions, causing 
American firms to be overly risk adverse.130 
A. Monetary and Reputational Consequences 
Firms immersed in full-blown FCPA investigations spend enormous 
sums on legal fees, forensic accounting fees, and other investigative 
                                                 
125 Doty, supra note 26, at 1252 (emphasis added); see also Trautman & Alternbaumer-
Price, supra note 16, at 148 (noting the inevitable “co-dependence” between the United 
States and Chinese economies). Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price also explain that even 
if an American firm is not currently doing business overseas, “the overwhelming odds are 
that it will in the future.” Id. at 149. 
126 See supra Part I.A–B. 
127 See supra Part I.D. 
128 See supra Part I.C. 
129 See infra Part II.A. 
130 See infra Part II.B. 
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costs.131 For example, Baker Hughes conducted an internal investigation 
that cost $50 million, in addition to paying $44 million in penalties.132 
Avon Products reported in its February 2011 quarterly SEC filing that it 
spent $59 million more in 2010 than 2009 on “professional and related 
fees associated with [its] FCPA investigation and compliance reviews.”133 
Not only do firms spend a tremendous amount of money on legal and 
investigative costs, but settlements also are burdensome. Indeed, in recent 
years, the monetary amount of FCPA settlements has increased dramati-
cally.134 Examples include the high-profile settlements involving U.S. com-
panies such as Halliburton Co. and Johnson & Johnson.135 In 2010, eight 
of the top ten FCPA settlements were reached,136 and in the past five years, 
corporations’ penalties under the FCPA have amounted to $4 billion.137 
Firms facing FCPA scrutiny also have to deal with the reputational 
consequences that come along with such scrutiny, something former SEC 
                                                 
131 Klobuchar and Coons Letter, supra note 40 (“[I]t has become apparent that too 
many companies are devoting a disproportionate amount of resources to FCPA compli-
ance and internal investigations.”); WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 5 (“Businesses 
enmeshed in a full-blown FCPA investigation conducted by the U.S. government ... will 
continue to spend enormous sums on legal fees, forensic accounting, and other inves-
tigative costs before they are even confronted with a fine or penalty, which ... can range 
into the tens or hundreds of millions.”); see also Yockey, FCPA Settlement, supra note 99, 
at 702 (“Litigating an FCPA case is not cheap.”). Yockey notes the “unique complexities 
involved in FCPA cases” such as “obtaining evidence from foreign countries,” communicat-
ing with foreigners, and making travel arrangements. Id. To this end, recently, law firms 
have increased hiring in temporary attorneys who have foreign-language skills in part to 
help review documents associated with FCPA investigations. See Jennifer Smith, Wanted: 
Temp Attorneys with Foreign-Language Skills, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2012, at B1, B5. 
132 Peter Jeydel, Note, Yoking the Bull: How to Make the FCPA Work for U.S. Business, 
43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 523, 527 n.21 (2012). 
133 Avon Products, Annual Report (Form 10-k) (Feb. 24, 2011) at 29, available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/8868/000119312511044531/d10k.htm. Since 2009, 
Avon’s cumulative legal costs due to FCPA investigations total $248 million. Joe 
Palazzolo, et al., Prosecutors Ask to Meet Jung in Avon Bribe Probe, WALL ST. J., July 
30, 2012, at B1, B2. 
134 WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 2; see also Christopher Matthews and Joe 
Palazzolo, Pfizer Near Settlement on Bribery, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2011, at B1–B2, avail 
able at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203710704577050303870770014 
.html (noting that Pfizer Inc. will pay more than $60 million and Johnson and Johnson 
$70 million to resolve U.S. government anti-bribery probes). 
135 Joe Palazzolo, Business Slams Bribery Act—Lobby Urges Curbs in Wake of $4 
Billion in Corruption Fines, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2011, at B1; see Corporate Watch, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, at B6 (reporting that Halliburton paid $579 million to resolve violations). 
136 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
137 Palazzolo, supra note 135, at B1. 
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General Counsel James Doty deems “wear[ing] the scarlet letter” of FCPA 
actions.138 These consequences include exclusion from future transactions 
and government contracts,139 in addition to future difficulties securing fi-
nancing from lending institutions.140 
B. Disincentives to Partake in International Business Transactions 
Because of the monetary and reputational consequences that stem from 
FCPA scrutiny, American businesses have become more adverse to under-
taking business transactions abroad.141 This adverseness also stems from 
the lack of predictability regarding whether a particular firm’s conduct is 
within the bounds of the FCPA.142 Firms depend on a certain amount of 
litigation predictability so that they can take chances in untapped markets, 
develop complicit transactional plans, and inform employees on how to 
comply with these plans.143 When the FCPA threatens predictability, 
                                                 
138 Doty, supra note 26, at 1253. 
139 Morgan, supra note 78, at 3 (noting that accepting a DPA may be identical to an 
indictment for a company seeking future government contracts). 
140 FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 40 (statement of George J. Terwilliger, III, 
Partner, White & Case, LLP) (explaining the “risk to reputation that can arise” from 
FCPA scrutiny); Doty, supra note 26, at 1253. 
141 FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 40 (statement of George J. Terwilliger, III) 
(“When faced with [FCPA] uncertainty, companies sometimes forgo deals they could 
otherwise do, take a pass on contemplated projects or withdraw from ongoing projects or 
ventures.”); Palazzolo, supra note 135, at B8 (noting evidence suggesting that U.S. 
“companies shun [oversea] deals for fear of triggering FCPA probes”); see also Nicholas 
M. McLean, Note, Cross-National Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 1970, 
1980 (2012) (explaining that the possibility of an FCPA enforcement action “may 
dissuade U.S. firms from investing in [certain] countries”). Other scholars, however, have 
expressed doubt that the FCPA stifles foreign investment. See Macleans A. Geo-JaJa & 
Garth L. Mangum, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s Consequences for U.S. Trade: 
The Nigerian Example, 24 J. BUS. ETHICS 245, 251–52 (2000) (concluding that the FCPA 
has not disadvantaged American firms). 
142 See Doty, supra note 26, at 1234 (“Criminal and civil prosecution, which presently 
constitute the principal source of guidance on an important sector of economic activity, 
should recede as the basis on which registrants plan their transactions.”); id. at 1239 
(noting the lack of predictability associated with the Act); see also Weiss, supra note 11, 
at 505 (“Regulatory uncertainty has been quantitatively shown to be particularly harmful 
to investment in other contexts—for example, antitrust—and, while no quantitative study 
is available for foreign bribery, the likely result is similarly undesirable.”). 
143 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 4 (1997), (“[P]redictability of ... rules and policies and the consistency with 
which they are applied ... can be as important for attracting private investment as the 
content of those rules and policies.”). 
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American firms—both large and small144—become risk adverse and stop 
investing in certain oversea markets.145 
A recent Dow Jones risk and compliance survey demonstrated the 
chilling effect that the FCPA has on American firm investment overseas. 
The survey found that fifty-one percent of companies had delayed a business 
initiative and fourteen percent had abandoned an initiative altogether be-
cause of unpredictable anti-corruption laws.146 As an example of a company 
abandoning an initiative, in 2009, oil services firm Ensco International 
elected to abandon its Nigerian operations directly because of its concerns 
regarding FCPA scrutiny with regard to payments made to officials for per-
mission to import oil-drilling rigs.147 Additionally, oil firms that previously 
had operations in Kazakhstan have withdrawn because of the fear of FCPA 
exposure.148 More recently, there is a fear that makers of medical devices 
will begin scaling back operations in countries that provide state-owned 
health care, including Argentina, Brazil, and China.149 The FCPA is impli-
cated in these circumstances because of the expansive view that healthcare 
professionals are foreign officials in these countries.150 
The problems with risk aversion are that American firms are not max-
imizing their capital and are at a competitive disadvantage in comparison 
                                                 
144 Jeydel, supra note 132, at 531 (noting the small businesses are “often paralyzed by 
the FCPA”). 
145 Klobuchar & Coons Letter, supra note 40 (explaining that “[o]ver-compliance ... 
can have a negative effect on product development, export promotion, and workforce 
expansion”); Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (explaining that the FCPA threatens “U.S. 
foreign competitiveness with a growing risk of exclusion of U.S. companies from foreign 
markets”); Andrew Brady Spalding, Four Uncharted Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In 
Search of Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 661, 662 (“[N]umerous 
data sources today confirm that FCPA enforcement leads to a reduction in investment by 
US companies ... in countries perceived to be relatively corrupt.”); Vardi, supra note 19 
(“FCPA enforcement will cause U.S. companies to reduce investments in places where 
corruption is common or make them uncompetitive there.”). 
146 Dow Jones Survey: Confusion About Anti-Corruption Laws Leads Companies to 
Abandon Expansion Initiatives, DOW JONES (Dec. 9, 2009), http://fis.dowjones.com/risk 
/09survey.html. Professor Spalding notes that these statistics make sense because “if we 
increase the costs of conducting business in specific ways, we will of course tend to do 
less of that business.” Spalding, supra note 145, at 665. 
147 Vardi, supra note 19. 
148 Id. 
149 See Christopher M. Matthews, Corporate News: Biomet Settles Bribery Charge, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2012, at B3. 
150 See id.; see also Justice’s Bribery Racket, supra note 30 (quoting Senator 
Klobuchar as stating “in today’s China, a nurse could be construed as a foreign official 
because they work for the state”). 
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to “their foreign counterparts who do not have significant FCPA expo-
sure.”151 In a 1999 report to Congress, the Congressional Research Service, 
a nonpartisan group that provides analysis on legislative issues, estimated 
that the FCPA’s anti-bribery “provisions have cost up to [$1 trillion] an-
nually in lost [U.S.] export trade.”152 In this vein, it may be useful to con-
sider that the majority of countries with anti-bribery laws provide for an 
adequate procedures defense to liability.153 Corporations in those countries 
are able to defend against anti-bribery enforcement actions by showing 
that they had procedures and policies guarding against bribery in place.154 
In the U.S., such a defense is not available,155 and thus, a certain amount 
of incongruity exists between America’s approach to worldwide bribery 
and other countries’ approaches.156 
American firms are in need of a tool that will put them on an even 
playing field with their foreign counterparts.157 This tool will also strike the 
proper balance between incentivizing foreign investment while at the same 
time incentivizing compliance with the Act and not condoning bribery.158 
This tool is an adequate procedures defense, a proposal detailed next. 
III. ADEQUATE PROCEDURES DEFENSE: DETAILS AND 
PROJECTED OUTCOMES 
The best solution for altering the current overreach of the FCPA is for 
Congress to amend the FCPA to add an adequate procedures defense.159 
                                                 
151 WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 6 (explaining that the FCPA has made 
American firms less competitive in foreign markets); Vardi, supra note 19 (noting that 
U.S. companies are disadvantaged in the worldwide bribery landscape). 
152 MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30079, FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 2 (1999). 
153 Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 635–36. 
154 Id. at 635–44 (documenting a defense similar to an adequate procedures defense as 
part of anti-bribery statutes in the U.K., Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). 
155 Id. at 627 (noting that currently a “company’s pre-existing compliance policies and 
procedures are not relevant as a matter of law to the organization’s criminal liability”). 
156 Bribery Abroad: A Tale of Two Laws, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www 
.economist.com/node/21529103 (noting the difference between the FCPA and U.K.’s 
analog insomuch as the U.K. anti-bribery regime contains a compliance defense). For the 
text of the U.K.’s compliance defense, see Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (U.K.). 
157 Cf. Doty, supra note 26, at 1252 (explaining that enforcement of the FCPA does 
not have to come at the expense of competiveness of U.S. firms). 
158 See WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 7 (arguing for improvements to the 
FCPA, “aimed at providing more certainty to the business community,” while keeping 
intact the “integrity of the free market system”). 
159 Id. (arguing that improvements to the FCPA “are best suited for Congressional 
action”); see also Justice’s Bribery Racket, supra note 30 (arguing for Congressional action 
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The SEC and DOJ should then promulgate a rule detailing the factors that 
will be considered in determining what constitutes an adequate procedure. 
This defense will increase compliance with the Act while allowing American 
corporations to invest aggressively in international operations. 
A. Legislative Amendment Followed by Administrative Guidance 
This section suggests specific statutory language that could be adopted 
by Congress to provide for an adequate procedures defense. It further sug-
gests specific factors that could be promulgated by the DOJ and SEC for 
determining whether a corporation’s procedures were adequate. 
1. Congressional Action 
Recently, Congress has scrutinized the FCPA in committee hearings.160 
Although no official amendments have been proposed, one idea under dis-
cussion is an adequate procedures defense.161 The time has now come for 
Congress to pass this defense and give American firms a tool against the 
overreach of the FCPA. 
In turning to the specific statutory language, this Article suggests the 
following: 
Any corporation subject to the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA that 
has established and implemented “adequate procedures” designed to 
                                                                                                                         
with respect to the FCPA). But see Richard L. Cassin, Jacobson to DOJ: Fix FCPA 
Enforcement Policy, THE FCPA BLOG (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog 
/2012/4/16/jacobson-to-doj-fix-fcpa-enforcement-policy.html (noting that former DOJ 
FCPA prosecutor William Jacobson stated that Congressional action and FCPA amend-
ments were unnecessary). 
160 See generally FCPA Hearing, supra note 32; Examining Enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drug of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Examining Enforcement Hearing], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66921 
.pdf. Indeed, this defense is not a novel idea: in 1986, Representative Howard L. Berman 
proposed a “due diligence” affirmative defense. Trade and International Economic Policy 
Reform Act of 1986, H.R. 4800, 99th Cong. (1986). The House adopted the defense, but it 
was ultimately not included in the legislation signed into law. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-576 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547. 
161 FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 4–5 (statement of Rep. Conyers, Member, House 
Comm. on the Judiciary) (“I want to tell you a suggested amendment that I can support, 
and that is the addition of a compliance defense which would permit companies to fight 
the imposition of criminal liability for these FCPA violations if individual employees or 
agents had circumvented compliance measures that were otherwise reasonable in iden-
tifying such violations.”). 
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detect and prevent bribery in foreign countries shall not be liable for the 
vicarious actions of its employees in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement 
proceedings. The DOJ and SEC are to promulgate a list of factors to be 
considered in determining whether a procedure constitutes an “ade-
quate procedure.” 
A number of considerations about this statutory language are signifi-
cant. First, the statute makes clear that the defense will only apply to cor-
porations (not individuals) subject to the anti-bribery provisions of the 
FCPA. Second, it establishes the defense when a corporation has both es-
tablished and implemented adequate procedures, meaning that the corpo-
ration must show more than the mere establishment of procedures through 
“paper-based” polices; it must show that these policies were implemented. 
Third, the language incorporates both a detection component and preven-
tion component to combat bribery,162 meaning that corporations should 
show that they actively analyzed areas of potential weakness where brib-
ery might occur (detection) and systems were implemented to deter the 
illegal conduct from happening (prevention). Lastly, the defense mandates 
that the DOJ and SEC further clarify the defense by promulgating a list of 
factors to be considered in determining whether procedures were adequate. 
2. Administrative Guidance 
The DOJ and SEC should follow Congress’s command and promulgate 
a list of factors to be considered in determining what constitutes an ade-
quate procedure.163 This clarity will give American firms guidance in de-
veloping and implementing anti-bribery policies and procedures, aimed at 
incentivizing compliance with the Act. Additionally, the factors establish a 
greater amount of predictability for firms operating overseas, taking away 
some of the current uncertainty associated with FCPA’s expansive reach. 
                                                 
162 See BIEGELMAN & BIEGELMAN, supra note 16, at 212 (“An effective [compliance] 
program is a program that works to prevent and detect violations of the law.”). 
163 The DOJ has this ability under the 1988 FCPA amendment. See Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(e), 102 Stat. 1107, 1417–18 
(1988). The 1998 amendments allow the DOJ to determine whether the business com-
munity’s compliance with the FCPA would be enhanced “by further clarification of the 
[anti-bribery] provisions.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(d). If the DOJ finds that such clarification 
is needed, it is authorized to issue these guidelines, detailing conduct that would conform 
to the Act’s anti-bribery provisions. Id. This prior legislation, in addition to the legislation 
this Article proposes, is more than enough legal authority for the DOJ to take the sug-
gested course and promulgate a list of factors. With respect to the SEC, the agency has 
this ability under its Opinion Release Procedure. See supra note 86. 
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This Article suggests the following factors (which should not be con-
sidered as being mutually exclusive from one another) in determining 
whether a defense will be deemed adequate by a judicial body: 
 Board and Management Commitment: a commitment by the 
board of directors and management to detect and prevent 
bribery. 
 Policies and Procedures in Place Designed to Detect Bribery: 
mechanisms established with the goal of analyzing the peo-
ple and places where bribery may be a weakness. 
 Policies and Procedures in Place Designed to Prevent Bribery: 
mechanisms established with the goal of deterring bribery. 
 Effective Implementation: ensuring that the policies and pro-
cedures are embedded and carried out throughout the firm. 
 Consistent Bribery Compliance Review: reviewing the firm’s 
bribery policies, procedures, mechanisms, and overall com-
pliance on a consistent basis. 
These factors address the main areas associated with a strong compliance 
program including top-level commitment, detection and prevention mech-
anisms, and consistent review.164 Because they are generally prescribed, it 
ensures that corporations will have the freedom to implement programs 
that best fit their respective situations.165 Additionally, the effective imple-
mentation factor helps ensure that firm bribery prevention actually exists 
and that policies and procedures are more than mere paper-based policies 
and procedures. 
Specifically, with regard to the procedural mechanisms associated with 
the defense, the defense would be asserted by a firm as an affirmative de-
fense to liability in a FCPA enforcement action. Then, assuming the firm 
can show that a number of the factors listed above were sufficiently pre-
sent, the DOJ, SEC, or both may be more willing to drop the lawsuit or set-
tle for a nominal amount. If the case proceeded to trial, the judiciary 
would then apply and weigh the factors above. 
Of course, like any legal proposal, there are a number of critiques that 
could be made against the adequate procedures defense, which this Article 
addresses below. Before addressing these critiques, however, the next sec-
tion explains the projected outcomes of the defense. 
                                                 
164 See BIEGELMAN & BIEGELMAN, supra note 16, at 212. 
165 Cf. William C. Athanas, When Doing Business Internationally Becomes a Crime: 
Assisting Clients in Understanding and Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
71 ALA. LAW. 382, 386 (noting that compliance programs should not be “one size fits all”). 
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B. Striking the Proper Balance: Predicted Outcomes of the Defense 
Currently, firms have no recognized legal incentive to implement proce-
dures designed to prevent bribery.166 There is no defense when an employee 
decides to go rogue and bribe a foreign official.167 To be sure, the DOJ has 
stated that anti-bribery procedures are considered at sentencing.168 However, 
this consideration only takes place after liability is determined—certainly 
little protection against aggressive prosecution.169 With the legal recognition 
of an adequate procedures defense, companies will be motivated to imple-
ment compliance programs.170 These programs will lead to less bribery and 
will allow the FCPA to accomplish its original goal.171 
The defense will also give firms a counterweight to balance against the 
current overreach of the FCPA. Although this defense does not prevent the 
                                                 
166 Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 627. 
167 Doty, supra note 26, at 1235 (noting that “current law leaves largely unresolved 
the central issue of when a company’s compliance system and anti-bribery policy are 
[legally] sufficient” to guard against FCPA liability). 
168 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2012). 
169 FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 24 (statement of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey) 
(“There is [currently] no guarantee that a strong compliance program will be given the 
weight it deserves.”); WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 13 (explaining that anti-bribery 
procedures should be considered during the liability phase of litigation, not just at sentencing). 
170 Cf. Andrew Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 432–33 (detailing the lack of incentives for corporations “to 
implement effective compliance programs” given that “[u]nder the current legal regime, a 
corporation is given no benefit at all under the law for even the best internal compliance 
program if such crime nevertheless occurs”); see also Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry 
Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate 
Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2007). In terms of incentivizing adequate pro-
cedures designed at complying with the Act, it may be useful to consider the United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). In 
Kolstad, the Court, in examining punitive damages under a Title VII claim, held that “an 
employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of 
managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts 
to comply with Title VII.’” Id. at 545. The court implied that its holding was due in part 
to concerns that the existing standard was “[d]issuading employers from implementing 
programs or policies to” comply with Title VII. Id. at 545. Similar logic can be applied to the 
FCPA context because the current standard does not affirmatively persuade employers to 
adopt adequate procedures designed to prevent against bribery. In fact, evidence suggests 
that “very few companies are actually implementing best-in-class FCPA policies and 
procedures.” The Benefits of an FCPA ‘Compliance Defense,’ CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 18, 
2012) (interview by Catherine Dunn of Mike Koehler). 
171 Klobuchar & Coons Letter, supra note 40 (noting “that effective guidance will 
allow [U.S.] companies to comply with the [Act] more efficiently”); Koehler, Revisiting, 
supra note 20, at 656 (explaining that incentives to compliance will reduce instances of 
bribery and advance the FCPA’s objectives). 
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DOJ or SEC from bringing actions, the defense could be influential at a 
number of junctures in the litigation process, thereby reducing the mone-
tary and reputational impact that a firm suffers.172 First, if a corporation 
demonstrates that it had adequate procedures in place, the DOJ or SEC 
may be less likely to start enforcement actions, saving the firm money in 
legal fees and potential penalties. Second, assuming lawsuits commence, 
firms will be less likely to settle for high sums when they know that a legit-
imate defense against liability exists. This will, in turn, either force the agen-
cies to settle at nominal amounts or proceed to trial, where the adequate 
procedures defense can be used to absolve a firm from liability. Addition-
ally, if more FCPA corporate bribery cases go to trial, this will have the 
added benefit of judicial clarification of the Act.173 
Not only does the adequate procedures defense limit a firm’s liability 
exposure, but it also adds predictability to a firm’s overseas actions.174 
American corporations will be more likely to invest in resource-rich areas—
even those areas that may be prone to bribery—if they know that their good-
faith efforts to detect and prevent bribery will be given legal recognition.175 
This added dimension (i.e., the defense) incentivizes overseas investment, 
ingenuity, and growth. As part and parcel of a firm’s transactional plan, a 
plan to prevent bribery can be implemented, and uncertainty over compli-
ance with the FCPA disappears.176 
An adequate procedures defense also aligns the FCPA with other for-
eign anti-bribery regimes that contain a similar defense.177 Because the 
FCPA has been shown to affect American firms negatively in comparison 
                                                 
172 See supra Part II.A (documenting the monetary and reputational consequences that 
come along with FCPA scrutiny). 
173 Cf. FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 2 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (explain-
ing that “the absence of case law ... confounds industries’ ability to conform to the law”); 
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that current incentives to settle enforce-
ment actions “ensure that judicial oversight of FCPA cases will continue to be limited”). 
174 Cf. Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (implying that consistency and predictability in 
the FCPA context will allow corporations “to accomplish complex tasks in difficult for-
eign venues”); Koehler, Revisiting, supra note 20, at 658 (noting that a compliance defense 
would make the FCPA enforcement “more transparent, consistent, and predictable”). 
175 See Doty, supra note 26, at 1239 (noting that the managers and directors of corpora-
tions want to comply with the FCPA, but that they just need to know “the how-to-do-it”). 
176 Interestingly, one former DOJ official explained that firms that implement anti-
bribery procedures find it improves business: “[T]hey are more profitable, not less prof-
itable when they have appropriate controls in place.” Interview by PBS Frontline with 
Mark Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Apr. 7, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/blackmoney 
/interviews/mendelsohn.html). 
177 See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
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to their foreign counterparts,178 an adequate procedures defense would 
place American firms on an equal playing field.179 
C. Responses to Anticipated Critique 
This Article will now rebut a number of criticisms that will be made in 
response to this proposal. First, opponents of a statutorily created defense 
note that a de facto adequate procedures defense already exists because the 
DOJ takes into consideration the existence of these procedures in decid-
ing whether to prosecute, and these procedures are also credited at sen-
tencing.180 Thus, these opponents claim that incentives already exist for a 
firm to implement adequate anti-bribery procedures.181 However, with re-
spect to prosecutorial discretion, this “opaque carrot” is not the proper way 
to incentivize behavior, as discretion still remains, and therefore, litigation 
can proceed.182 Moreover, with regard to sentencing credit, this considera-
tion takes place after liability is established183 and after firms have invested 
monetary sums on investigative and legal fees. In contrast, the adequate 
procedures defense can be used to thwart liability,184 which leads to less 
monetary investment on litigation-based expenses. Additionally, the defense 
provides a real “tangible carrot” that incentivizes firms to comply with the Act. 
Second, critics of the proposal may suggest that an adequate proce-
dures defense could become a “blueprint for fraud”185 in that firms just 
                                                 
178 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
179 See FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 24 (statement of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey) 
(noting that the addition of a compliance defense would “ensure consistent application of 
anti-corruption law across jurisdictions”). 
180 Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 26 (statement of Greg Andres, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General) (“[T]he Department already considers a company’s 
compliance efforts in making appropriate prosecutorial decisions, and the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines also appropriately credits a company’s compliance efforts in any 
sentencing determination.”); see also David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery: 
Sustaining the Global Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPEN SOC’Y 
FOUNDS., Sept. 2011, at 29, available at http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1102&context=slaw_fac_pubs (noting that “the DOJ and SEC regularly take a company’s 
compliance efforts into account at every stage of the enforcement process”). 
181 Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 26 (statement of Greg Andres). 
182 See FCPA Hearing, supra note 32, at 23 n.2 (statement of the Hon. Michael B. 
Mukasey) (noting that “the government has complete discretion as to how much credit to 
give for such a program”). 
183 Id. at 24. 
184 See Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 15 (statement of Andrew 
Weisman, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP) (“The statute should be modified ... to mandate con-
sideration of compliance programs during the liability discussion of an FCPA prosecution.”). 
185 Doty, supra note 26, at 1249 (noting one potential critique to his Reg. FCPA 
proposal: that it is a “blueprint for fraud”). 
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have to give the impression of adequate procedures and policies and then 
the defense can be utilized. As part and parcel of this argument, critics 
may argue that companies just “need to implement ... purely paper com-
pliance program[s].”186 However, as noted above, both the Congressional 
text establishing the defense and the administrative factors related to it 
discern whether policies were actually implemented—that is, any defense 
solely based on paper policies will not be adequate. To be sure, there is 
always a judicial check on the defense; in cases that are litigated to the 
end, the judiciary will be able to assess and apply the various factors, pre-
venting firms from using the defense as a license and blueprint for fraud. 
Third, supporters of the current regime claim that the FCPA’s ambigu-
ous nature is integral to its purposes of preventing bribery.187 As explained 
throughout this Article, however, the adequate procedures defense aims to 
further this anti-bribery goal by incentivizing firms to implement procedures 
designed to prevent bribery. At the same time, the defense mitigates some of 
the negative business impacts associated with the Act’s current overreach. 
CONCLUSION 
Today many American corporations must look to develop business 
outside of the U.S. For these firms, complying with the FCPA is difficult, 
if not outright near impossible because of the Act’s overreach. Firms then 
become risk adverse, often times opting to not pursue potential foreign 
growth areas, resulting in market inefficiency and competitive disadvan-
tage. These firms are in desperate need of a tool that will allow the FCPA’s 
anti-bribery policy goals to continue while at the same time providing clarity 
to spur overseas investment. This tool is an adequate procedures defense. 
                                                 
186 Examining Enforcement Hearing, supra note 160, at 26 (statement of Greg Andres); 
see also Kennedy & Danielsen, supra note 180, at 31 (arguing that a “fig leaf” compliance 
program would insulate firms from liability). 
187 Doty, supra note 26, at 1249. 
